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I.  PREAMBLE 
The Communication sent in 1996 to the Council and the European Parliament
1 
and the attached third report of  the Standing Working Group on the Safe 
Transport of  Radioactive Material (TRM) remain valid. They contain 
comprehensive information on the situation, prospects for further developments 
and recommendations for a study programme. 
This Commission Communication covering the fourth report of  the Standing 
Working Group is mainly intended to update and supplement the information 
presented one and a half years ago in the previous report and now emphasises: 
the recent changes to the IAEA transport regulations, their prospects of 
implementation and implications for the future; 
the latest activities conducted or supported by the Commission; 
recent events in the Member States which have had an influence on the 
public perception of  safety in transport operations. 
Proposals for further Commission actions within a multi-annual framework are 
presented in Appendix I, taking into account the recommendations made by the 
Standing Working Group in its fourth report. This programme is part of  the 
frame work programme for actions  in the energy sector, adopted by the 
Commission in November 1997• and presently examined by the Council and the 
European Parliament. 
II.  CHANGES TO INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT REGULATIONS 
• 
1 
The use of  radioactive material, in particular by the nuclear power industry, 
inevitably involves its transport and, o"ver the years, national, Community and 
international regulations have been developed to ensure that such transport 
operations are carried out safely. 
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The fundamental requirement for the safety of  nuclear transport operations is 
that all transport practices meet the basic safety standards.  Packages alone, for 
example, have to meet the same requirements under all circumstances, 
including severe accident conditions. 
To embrace this principle, and in the light of  improved knowledge, technical 
progress and growing experience, international regulations have been changed 
in ways which will influence future transport practices. 
At European Union level, in May 1996, the Council adopted the revised basic 
safety standards
2 for the protection of  the health of  workers and the general 
public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation. The provisions of 
the Directive have to be transposed into national law by 13 May 2000 at the 
latest. 
At international level the IAEA Board of  Governors adopted and then 
published in December 1996 new Advisory Regulations for the Safe Transport 
of  Radioactive Material (ST  -1 ). The provisions of  the Advisory Regulations 
should be implemented by the different modal organisations and the IAEA 
Member States on 1 January 2001. 
The radioprotection aspects of  the ST  -1  regulations on transport practices are 
consistent with the requirements of  the revised basic safety standards Directive 
and should therefore lead, in the Member States of  the European Union, to a 
coherent set of  national regulations. 
The review of  the IAEA transport regulations currently in force
3 led the IAEA 
to publish, in December 1996, the revised version of  ST  -1.  It is structured in 
much the same way as before but includes: 
amendments to the activity limits per consignment (including 
exemption limits) because of  the radionuclide-specific approach; 
the introduction ofa new type of  package (type C) to meet more 
stringent criteria than those specified for the existing type B packages 
to be used in particular for the transport by air of  certain high activity 
shipments;  ' 
the extension of  type B category of  packages to permit transport by air 
of  what is termed as "Low dispersible material" (LDM); 
special provisions for packages containing uranium hexafluoride taking 
particular account of  the chemical hazard of  the material; 
the extensive review of  criticality safety; 
the incorporation of  a new system of  UN numbers for packages and 
conveyances in line with the dangerous goods classification. 
Council Directive 96/29 Euratom of 13  May 1996, OJ  Ll59/l of29.6.1996 
fNTERNA TIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY  -Regulations for the Safe Transport of 
Radioactive Materials-Safety Series N°. 6- 1985 edition (as amended 1990). The attached report of  the Standin·g Working Group gives a more 
comprehensive account of  these changes. 
There has recently been public concern over the proposed new test conditions 
for type C packages, as well as for packages of  type B containing LDM, since: 
- the USA appear to impose more stringent test requirements on packages used 
in the air transport of  Plutonium 
- and it was felt that the performance characteristics for such packages should 
be similar to those imposed on Flight Data Recorders (FDRs). 
The Commission has consulted the Standing Working Group on this issue; the 
Group expressed the view that the revised regulations adopted by the IAEA 
provide substantive additional protection for the transport of radioactive 
material in EU Member States. No evidence has been put fonvard that the 
requirements of  the new regulations are inadequate. 
The experts assessment is that the IAEA' s  proposed ST  -1  advisory regulations 
strengthen the existing rules by adding more specific and more stringent 
requirements and that they will enable stringent uniform transport regulations 
to be applied in the European Union. 
This being said, the concerns expressed and the arguments put forward will 
continue to be carefully considered by the IAEA' s Co-ordinated Research 
Programmes (CRP), under which air and sea accident severity assessments are 
being reviewed. The outcome of  the studies undertaken by the Commission's 
action programme on the safe transport of  radioactive materials will also 
provide direct input to the abovementioned CRP and any future revision of  the 
regulations.  It is in any case advisable to update the IAEA regulations more 
frequently than once every ten years (as at present), and this has been 
advocated by the Commission. 
III.  IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REVISED REGULATIONS 
3 
While the basic ST  -1  transport regulations are advisory in nature (based on 
recommendations) they have., nevertheless, been fully implemented in the past 
via the regulations governing the transport of  class 7 goods (dangerous goods) 
by the various modes of  transport.  All the requirements for the transport of 
radioactive material have been implemented via the ADR (European 
Agreement concerning the International Carriage of  Dangerous Goods by 
Road), RID (Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Rail), ADN (European Agreement concerning the International 
Transport of  Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways), IMDG (International 
Maritime Dangerous Goods Code) and ICAO-TI (International Civil Aviation 
Organisation- Technical Instructions). 
The different modal organisations are expected to integrate the ST  -1  advisory 
regulations over the next few years, with the five abovementioned modal 
regulations entering into force simultaneously on 1 January 2001. Through the application of  the Council Directives 94/55/EC
4 for road and 
96/49/ECs for rail, the amended ADR and RID European agreements 
implement the ST  -1  requirements as binding requirements in the European 
Community. 
IV.  RECENT COMMISSION ACTMTIES 
4 
6 
In 1996, the European Parliament authorised the re-opening of  the "Transport 
of  radioactive material" budget heading, and allocated to it ECU 2 million. 
, In 1997, the same heading was maintained but with "p.m." entered for 
commitments. 
On the basis of  the 1996 decision the Commission organised a public call for 
proposals which was issued in May 1996
6 in order to implement the actions 
described in the commentary on the budget heading. 
As a result, the Commission evaluated 43 proposals, made a selection and 
asked the Standing Working Group for its opinion on the selected proposals. 
Ofthese 43 proposals, 24 were selected (15 first priority and 9 second 
priority).  In 1996, contracts were awarded for 18 of  these proposals, granting 
them a Community financial contribution or subsidy.  An internal budget 
transfer ofECU 0,7 million in 1997 recently made it possible to award 
contracts for the remaining six proposals.  Details are annexed to the fourth 
report of  the Standing Working Group. 
The initial objective was to spread the available budget over the different issues 
identified in the commentary on the budget heading. This objective could not 
be achieved with complete balance. For example, no valid proposal could be 
financed in the field of  the improved safety of  nuclear transport in Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and the New Independent States {NIS). 
Similar difficulties were encountered with regard to the public perception ofthe 
transport of  radioactive material. 
For a number of  studies, only the first stage could..be financed in 1996/1997, 
covering an initial period of 12 months. These should be followed by a second 
stage in order to reap the full benefit ofthe initiatives undertaken, provided an 
appropriate programme is launched and the necessary budget made available. 
OJL319ofl2.12.1994,p. 7. 
OJ L23.5 of 17.09.1996, p.  2.5. 
OJ Cl36 of8.S.l996, p.l6 V.  RECENT EVENTS DURING NUCLEAR TRANSPORT ACTIVITIES 
In some regions of  the European Union, the public opposed to the use of 
lluclear energy is also objecting in particular to the transport of  nuclear 
material.  In Germany, for example, railway tracks and equipment were 
recently damaged in an attempt to disrupt the transport of  spent fuel and 
Yitrified waste to the Gorleben interim storage facility. Another example is a 
widespread campaign conducted in the North of  England, based on the 
concerns raised by an increase in shipments of  mixed-oxide fuel by air. Letters 
expressing these concerns were sent to Members of  the European Parliament. 
Demonstrations and public statements of  this type have attracted a lot of 
public and media attention increasing fears about these transport operations. In 
reality, the risks associated with the transport of  radioactive material are low, 
and incidents/accidents are few and of  little consequence.  It is therefore 
important that radioactive materials be managed and regulated according to 
their real risk.  · 
Accordingly, greater efforts should be made to infonn the public and the 
emergency services on the safety of  transport operations. The message should 
be that radioactive materials are transported in accordance with strict and 
i~temationally agreed safety reauiations which are constantly being reviewed 
and updated in the light of  new knowledge acquired through research and of 
experience gained world wide. 
VI. FUTURE COMMISSION ACTION 
s 
In order to influence the strategic rather than the tactical direction of  future 
international regulatory developments a longer tenn view has to be taken by 
the Commission and the Community. A multi-annual study programme such 
as that suggested by the Standing Working Group in its fourth report should be 
supported by the Community in application of  Euratom Treaty chapter III 
(health and safety), especially by implementing the basic safety standards for 
transport practices, derived from Council Directive 80/836/Euratom as 
amended by Directive 84/467/Euratom and recently replaced by Council 
Directive 96/29/Euratom. 
There is no risk of  duplication between such a programme and the Euratom 
framework research and training programmes of  the Community based on 
Articles 4 and 7 of  the Euratom Treaty, since the transport of  radioactive 
material is not mentioned in Annex 1 to the Treaty. With regard to the operation of  the internal market, the tendency nowadays is 
to seek harmonisation within the EU Member States on the basis of  the 
existing international conventions, norms and standards and to avoid 
introducing new provisions where these might lead to unnecessary duplication 
with existing international regulations. 
In the nuclear transport sector, this principle is largely implemented by 
following the IAEA basic regulations and the various modal regulations 
(ADRIRID, ADN, IMDG-Code rutd ICAO-TI) as explained in section III 
above. Nevertheless, it is till worth harmonising design, construction, 
packages and administrative procedures in order to facilitate shipments within 
the EU. 
Nuclear transport safety in the CEECs and the NIS also needs to be improved, 
with specific projects encouraging close cooperation between safety experts in 
these countries and the Community experts. 
Special attention should also be given to public information and 
communication projects in order to improve the public perception of  transport 
safety in relation to the Community's and the Member States' specific needs. 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
6 
In order to implement the recommendations set out in the fourth report of  the 
Standing Working Group, and having identified the areas for future action by 
the Commission, a multi-annual action plan for the transport of  radioactive 
material should be adopted by the Community. 
The following topics should be addressed in such an action plan : 
monitoring and analysis of  the present situation and future prospects 
with regard to nuclear transport practices in Member States, giving 
particular attention to the analysis of  incidents and accidents and to the 
features of  the packages; 
implementation of  the IAEA's advisory transport regulations (ST-1) by 
the international organisations responsible for the various modes of 
transport and, subsequently, by the Member States of  the EU; 
continuous revision and improvement (when needed) of  the 
international regulations in co-ordination with the IAEA and the 
various modal organisations; 
particular attention to be given to informing the public and training the 
personnel involved in transport operations, as well as to emergency 
response planning and the training of  emergency service personnel; 
cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries and the NIS 
in the abovementioned areas. 7 
Implementation of  the action plan would, in particular, allow the Commission to 
study areas where further harmonisation is needed to help the Single Market 
operate smoothly in the case of  class 7 dangerous goods.  The topics to be 
addressed are as follows: 
- Competent Authority approval certificates for packages; 
- documentation on the compliance of  the package design with the requirements 
(for packages other than type B and C); 
- quality assurance procedures and quality control; 
-approval and authorisation of  carriers and of shipments. 
Once the situation in the Member States has been studied, the action plan will 
allow for practical suggestions to be made on how to achieve the necessary 
harmonisation measures in the European Union. The possible content of such a 
multi-annual work programme is given in Appendix 1. 
Chapter III of  the Euratom Treaty may serve as the legal basis for such a 
programme to be implemented by the Commission, with the support of  its 
Standing Working Group of  experts on the safe transport of  radioactive 
materials. APPENDIX! 
PROPOSED PROGRAMME OF ACTION 
ON THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 
The plan of  action covers a period of  five years. It runs from 1998 and will be 
reviewed year by year to remain in confonnity with the description given in the 
budget heading.  Any substantial modification will be an integral part of  a 
Com:mission communication to the Council and European Parliament on the subject. 
The following programme is rather comprehensive and priority choices will have to 
be made in accordance with the budget available year by year.  · · 
1.  Operation of  the Single Market and Harmonisation Measures 
1.1.  Harmonisation of  the Competent Authority approval certificate for. 
packages of  types A (F), B and C, covering the quality assurance 
programmes for package design, testing, manufacturing, use, 
reinspection and transportation. 
1.2.  Harmonisation of  the documentation on the compliance of  the package 
design with the requirement (ST-1, para. 801) for excepted packages 
and packages of  type IP-1, -2, -3 and Type A. 
1.3.  Harmonisation of  quality assurance procedures, and guidance on those 
procedures to be given to package designers, manufacturers, users and 
consignorS. 
1.4.  Harmonisation of, and guidance to be given on, quality assurance and 
quality control (QA I QC) for the conditioning and characterisation of 
waste produced by LW-NPP and the reprocessing ofiNF. 
1.5.  Harmonisation of  the Competent Authority requirements and 
procedures for the approval and authorisation of  carriers and 
shipments. 
2.  Implementation of  the regulations 
2.1  Survey of  the EU Member States' package testing capacities 
2.2  Assessment of  the EU Member States' capacity to use computer 
techniques for package safety analysis 
3.  Revision of  the Regulations 
8 
In-depth investigation of  proposals for revising the basic transport regulation 
(IAEA - ST  -1) so as to take account of: 
3.1  new developments; 
3.2  research and industrial experience; 
3.3  investigations into transport incidents and accidents. 4.  Investigation of  transport events 
4.1  Review, analysis and reporting of  the radiological consequences of 
accidents and incidents involving radioactive materials : 
updating the existing database; 
in-depth analysis and classification of  events; 
production of  training material. 
4.2  Further development of  guidance and criteria for the uniform 
reporting of  incidents and accidents. 
5.  Emergency Arrangements and Training 
5.1  Organising transport emergency training exercises involving different 
EU Member States. 
5.2  Drawing up a suitable training manual for organisations involved in 
emergency situations. 
5.3  Organising training courses. 
6.  Assistance to the CEECs and NIS 
6.1  Enlarging the Standing Working Group, with the voluntary 
participation of  CEECs. 
6.2  Drawing up an action prognunme to improve radioactive material 
transport safety. 
6.3  Organising training courses for representatives of Competent 
Authorities and personnel involved in transport operations in the 
CEECs and NIS (shared cost action with IAEA and/or PHARE I 
TACIS programmes). 
7.  Transport ¢ety information and communication 
7.1  Improving the existing Public Information Centres (promoting nuclear 
energy in the Member States) by providing appropriate information on 
the transport practices used in the different modes of  transport. 
7.2  Informing the public and the media on the various safety aspects of 
international transport operations in order to improve the public 
perception of  such transport. 10 
7.3  Developing acceptance and tolerability criteria for the risks arising 
from the transport of  radioactive materials; assessing the real risk with 
. reference to these criteria. 
7.4  Demonstrating that transport packages have inbuilt safety margins 
which go beyond design accident conditions (graceful failure). APPENDIX/I 
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Type C packages 
Uranium Hexafluoride 
Low Dispersible Material (LDM) SUMMARY 
I.  The Standing Working Group on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material was set up in 
1982 at the request of  the European Parliament. 
2.  This, the fourth report of  the Working Group, updates the report presented to the Council and 
Parliament on 3 April 1996.  Detail presented in that third report is not reproduced here. 
3.  A major development since the presentation of  the third report has been the publication of  the 
1996 edition of  the International Atomic Energy Agency's "Regulations for the Safe 
Transport of  Radioactive Material".  This will, in due course, be adopted world-wide for all 
modes of  transport, replacing the 1985 (as amended 1990) edition ct.irrently in force. 
4.  The report describes the major changes in the regulations, the ongoing. activities of  the IAEA 
and the responses and contributions of  the European Union to these processes.  Where 
activities, past or future, arise from major regulatory issues or public concerns these are 
summarised. 
5.  The activities of  the Standing Working Group are described in relation to these activities. Conclusion and Standing Working Group Recommendations 
The transport of radioactive material is a safe and well-regulated operation, and work is being 
undertaken within and outside the European Community to erisure that it remains so.  We 
acknowledge that accidents do occur and that human error cannot be entirely removed:  there is 
no room for complacency. 
Whilst Member States will continue to support the work of the IAEA, the EU as a whole has an 
influence through the attendance of officials at meetings and through the Standing Working 
Group's study programme. The Commission will co-ordinate with Member States to ensure 
consistency between the work going on in the Community and at international level, taking into 
account the new Community legislation on the transport of dangerous goods. 
The Standing Working Group's study programme has made a substantial contribution to the 
development of the international transport regulations, but in order to influence the strategic 
rather than tactical direction of regulatory development a longer term view needs to be taken. 
The five year study programme of the Standing Working Group needs to be supported by 
contiaued funding. 
15 1 INTRODUCTION 
This report was prepared by the Standing Working Group on the Safe Transport of Radioactive 
Material set up by the Commission in  1982 in response to Parliament's request.' This, the fourth report 
of the Working Group, updates the report presented to the Council and Parliament on 3 April 1996. 
Details presented in that third report are still valid and are therefore not reproduced here. 
The major development since the presentation of the previous report has been the publication of the 
1996 edition of the International Atomic Energy Agency's "Regulations for the Safe Transport of 
Radioactive Material"1.  This will, in due course, be adopted by the other international bodies that 
regulate the international carriage of  radioactive material, such as the International Maritime 
Organisation, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (for road transport) and the Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by 
Rail, and by Member States in their national legislation. 
It looks at the changes in radiation protection, packaging, criticality safety and administrative 
arrangements introduced by the new IAEA Regulations.  It describes the parallel developments in the 
EU and, in particular, the Basic Safety Standards and the Framework Directives.  It describes the major 
issues arising from the regulatory process and the concerns that have been raised.  Information is 
provided on those areas requiring further research which are the subject of  Co-ordinated Research 
Programmes initiated by the IAEA and/or contracts awarded under the general budget of  the European 
Union -Energy Policy- (budget heading B4-l 0 2 0). 
The importance of  the EU's work in regulatory development and the long-term contribution that it can 
make through a stable research programme is emphasised. 
2 DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE THIRD REPORT 
2.1  The Revised IAEA Transport Regulations 
In December 1996 the International Atomic Energy Agency published the 1996 edition of  the 
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material in a document called ST  -1.  Member States 
of the European Union (EU) and representatives ofthe Commission contributed greatly to the process. 
The following sections describe the most significant technical and administrative changes introduced 
into the 1996 edition of  the Regulations. 
2.1.1  Radiological protection 
General Provisions 
In the revised IAEA Regulations (ST  -1 ), the General Provisions on Radiation Protection have been 
redrafted. Some important changes have been introduced, including the need to establish Radiation 
Protection Programmes (RPPs) for the transport of radioactive material. RPPs emphasise the 
importance of  the General Provisions which provide the justification for maintaining the current 
regulatory limits for radiation levels around packages and conveyances. It is important to bear in mind 
that these limits have led, in general, to low individual and collective doses to both workers and 
members of  the public from transport operations.  RPPs should help ensure that this remains so and 
that individual doses are within the appropriate limits and as low as reasonably achievable. 
The provisions are consistent with the Basic Safety Standards (BSS) of  both the IAEA and Euratom. 
(See 2.3.1) 
7  0 J C40/44 of 15 February 1982. 
1  Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. 1996 edition.  Vienna 1996 
16 Exemption 
The IAEA Regulations have always contained criteria defining those materials which are subject to the 
requirements.  For example, the 1985 Regulations defined radioactive material as any material having 
a specific activity greater than 70 Bq/g. The Basic Safety Standards, however, use a radionuclide-
specific approach which leads to exemption values both greater and less than 70 Bq/g and spanning 
seven orders of  magnitude in total. The BSS also present exemption values for total activity quantities 
(Bq). This approach has been adopted by the 1996 IAEA transport regulations and they include values 
for both exempt activity concentrations and total activity. 
Limits on Package Contents. 
New package content limits are prescribed based on the Basic Safety Standards.  They incorporate 
revised radiation protection philosophy, dosimetry and data. 
2.1.2 Type C packages 
Agreement has been reached on requiring the use of a more robustly-designed package type, called a 
Type C package, for certain high-activity shipments transported by aircraft. Type C package designs 
will require unilateral Competent Authority approval unless they contain fissile material which requires 
multilateral approval by all the countries through or into which the consignment travels. 
2.1.3  Packaging requirements for Uranium Hexafluoride 
Specific regulatory provisions for the transport of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) have been adopted. The 
decision to draft regulations for a specific material reflects the importance of UF6 within the nuclear 
fuel cycle, the very large quantities being shipped and the peculiar physical and chemical properties of 
the material. The testing package requirements are presented in Appendix I. 
The hazard of unenriched UF6 in transport is largely chemical rather than radiological. One particular 
package is widely used for this transport; the 48Y bare cylinder carrying about 12 tons ofUF6. The 
new IAEA Regulations contain stricter requirements for such packages, especially concerning the 
thermal behaviour of  the package in order to prevent dangerous pressure build-up in the event of 
severe fires. 
2.1.4 Nuclear criticality safety 
Changes have been made to the types of radioactive material which are also classified as fissile 
material. and to the way in which packages containing fissile material are tested, assessed and labelled. 
Specific requirements for the carriage of  fissile material by air and for packages containing fissile 
uranium hexafluoride have also been introduced. 
2.1.5  Administrative arrangements 
Creating two package indexes 
The transport index (TI), previously used for both radiation protection and criticality control purposes, 
has been simplified and is now used for radiation protection purposes only.  It continues to be based on 
the radiation level at I m from the surface of  the package. 
A new index, the criticality safety index (CSI), controls the accumulation of  packages containing fissile 
material and is based on the allowable number of  packages that can be transported together. Separation 
of the two indices willlllow shipments to be controlled on the basis of  the specific value which is of 
concern. The changes introduce clarity which should improve compliance with the regulations. 
i7 New UN numbers 
The primary purpose of displaying United Nations numbers on packages, and on conveyances when 
appropriate. is to key into emergency response procedures in a language-independent way. It was felt 
that an expanded set of  UN numbers would help provide emergency workers with more specific 
response guidance. 
Under the new system, a UN number is assigned to each of the  14 Schedules appended to the 
Regulations, with an additional set of  numbers for packages containing fissile material. UN numbers 
are retained for uranium hexafluoride because of  its importance as a commercial substance and its 
subsidiary (corrosive) risk. The new UN numbers will facilitate more specific emergency response 
procedures and help with compliance checks and controls through a numerical link with the Schedules 
to the Regulations. 
Adoption of the IAEA regulations 
The 1996 edition of  the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material will be 
incorporated into.the modal agreements and conventions governing the transport of radioactive 
material internationally and into the national regulations of individual states. Efforts are being made at 
international level to have a uniform implementation date for this of January  I  st 200 I. A number of 
changes to the way fissile material is dealt with, particularly, the introduction of  a criticality safety 
index, makes it important that the date of entry into force of  the IAEA Regulations is harmonised for 
international movements. In addition, a single date for all transport modes has been strongly 
recommended since it is difficult to see how  op~rators undertaking multi-modal international 
movements would cope without a simultaneous transition from the 1985 to the  1996 Regulations in all 
modes. 
Transitional arrangements will be introduced for the approval of package designs.  In particular, 
packages manufactured to designs approved under either the 1973 or the 1985 IAEA Regulations may 
continue to be used subject to certain conditions and to the agreement of the Competent Authorities. 
All other requirements such as those related to the air transport of  Type C packages or packages 
containing fissile material, will take effect immediately upon implementation. 
2.2  The IAEA Co-ordinated Research Programmes 
In order to facilitate information exchange and to increase international co-operation in areas where 
research is needed, the IAEA has initiated a number of  co-ordinated research programmes (CRPs). 
Member states of  the European Union have been actively involved, often with fmancial support from 
the Community budget,. 
2.2.1  Uranium He.'tajluoride (UF6) 
A co-ordinated research programme has been undertaken to develop accurate, validated analytical 
codes for calculating tho thermal response of standard shipping cylinders containing UF6. The results 
of  the CRP are expected to aid the determination of  whether the bare cylinders, particularly the 48Y, 
can successfully pass the regulatory thermal test. 
The Co-ordinated Research Programme will probably reach completion in  1998. Important progress 
has already been reported about the modelling of  the thermal behaviour ofUF6 and of  the associated 
internal pressure build up and packaging behaviour.  Of particular importance are the results of  the 
Franco-Japanese "Tenerife" programme, being carried out in France with partial support from the 
European Union and combining large-scale experiments and analytical modelling. 
2.2.2  LSAISCO 
The packaging and transport requirements for Low Specific Activity (LSA) material and Surface 
Contaminated Objects (SCO) were of  great interest to a number of Member States during the  1996 
revision cycle. 
l8 The IAEA is initiating a Co-ordinated Research Programme entitled "development of  a radiological 
basis for the transport safety requirements for low specific activity materials and surface contaminated 
objects" in order to develop a dose-based approach to requirements.  Member States of the EU are 
involved and their contributions will be largely based on Community-financed work. 
2.2.3 Accident severity at sea 
A Co-ordinated Research Programme entitled "Accident severity at sea during transport of radioactive 
material" has been set up to address the consistency of IAEA test requirements with real accidents. 
This arose from concern expressed at the IMO as to whether the IAEA regulatory tests are as severe as 
real maritime accidents, and whether, therefore, radioactive material might be released as a result of 
package failure. A number of Member States of  the EU are involved and common studies are 
supported by the Community budget. 
At the first research coordination meeting, held in Vienna in November 1995, the participants 
presented existing and planned studies on this subject, covering topics such as the probabilistic 
assessment of  accidents at sea (mainly frres and collisions), frre scenarios on board dedicated ships, fire 
modelling, shipboard frre tests with simulated transport packages and the radiological consequences of 
a release of radioactive material. 
A specialist meeting was held in May 1996 in Cologne to consider in some detail several categories of 
accidents and to establish probabilities of  events. 
The second research coordination meeting took place in  September 1997 at Sandia National 
Laboratories - Albuquerque. The new studies performed by individual EU Member States as part of the 
CRP were presented and discussed. 
The CRP should be completed by about 1998, at which time a fmal report should be available. 
2.2.4  Air Transport 
Type C package tests were developed using data from various sources on the severity and frequency of 
aircraft accidents. To suppprt and update these studies, the IAEA is initiating a Co-ordinated Research 
Programme entitled "Accident Severity During Air Transport of Radioactive Material."  It will actively 
seek the participation of  the International Civil Aviation Organization and it is expected that member 
states of  the EU will play a significant role in the programme. 
2.3  Developments in the European Community 
At European Community level, the technical requirements for the safe transport of radioactive material 
are implemented via two legislative instruments: 
•  the Council Directive laying down the basic safety standa_rds for the protection of the health of 
workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation (The Basic 
Safety Standards or BSS) derived from the Treaty establishing. the European Atomic Energy 
Community commonly referred to as the EURATOM Treaty. 
•  the framework Council Directives on the approximation of  the laws of the Member States 
with regard to the transport of  dangerous goods by road and rail based on Article 7  5 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community (EC). 
2.3.1  Basic Safety Standards 
Radiation protection aims principally to protect the public and workers against the harmful effects of 
ionising radiation. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) founded in  1928, 
lay down the primary rules and principles governing radiation protection. The recommendations of  the 
ICRP are revised periodically to take account of  scientific progress in this field.  The current general 
recommendations of  the ICRP were laid down in  1990 (ICRP-60). On the basis of these 
recommendations the European Commission initiated the process of revising the Basic Safety 
Standards Directive. 
19 On  13 May 1996, the European Community (EC) adopted Directive 96/29/EURA TOM.
9 This 
Directive is to be transposed within four years (by 13 May 2000) into national law in each Member 
State of  the European Union. The European Community has the general and exclusive competence to 
adopt basic safety standards in the field of radiation protection. Member States have an executive 
power to adopt and implement the necessary measures in this field within the framework of  the 
standards laid down at Community level. 
Title II, Article 2 (a) of  Council Directive 96/29/EUR adopting the Basic Safety Standards stipulates. 
that all practices which involve risks from ionising radiation as the result of  the production, handling, 
use, holding, storage, transport, import to and export from the Comlll.unity and disposal of  radioactive 
substances must be subject to a regime of  reporting and prior authorisation. 
Although the IAEA transport regulations (ST-1) are based on the IAEA's own Basic Safety Standards
10 
there are no incompatibilities with the Council Directive on Basic Safety Standards in respect of 
transport. 
Two shipment control procedures, directly derived from the Basic Safety Standards, have been 
introduced for the purpose of  supervising transfers between Member States and imports into and 
exports from the Community.  Under these procedures, the Member States, including transit States, are 
informed, made aware and express their prior written consent before the movement or shipment can 
take place.  The procedures are laid down in: 
•  Council Directive 92/3/EUR
11 of3 February 1992 on the supervision and control of 
shipments of radioactive waste between Member States and into and out of  the 
Community supplemented by the Commission Decision 
12 of 1 October 1993 establishing 
the corresponding standard document. This procedure was derived from the 1980 version 
of  the Basic Safety Standards and is currently being considered for revision; 
•  Council Regulation 1493/93/EUR  13 of 8 June 1993 on shipments of  radioactive substances 
between Member States. 
The Basic Safety Standards and the shipment procedures require the Member States to adopt a strict 
regime of regulatory control.  The application by the Member States of a uniform control regime is 
fundamental to the harmonisation of  transport practices in the European Union. 
2.3.2  Community Framework Directives 
In order to harmonise the different sets of  rules on the transport of  dangerous goods, and to ensure not 
only a high level of  safety in the Community but also the smooth operation of  the European Single 
market, "framework directives" have been introduced, implementing the same technical safety 
standards at international and national level. The legal basis for this is Article 75 of the EC Treaty. 
Two  Council  directives  have  transposed  into  European  law  the  technical  annexes  of the  ADR 
(European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of  Dangero~s Goods by RHd) (Directive 
94/55/EC  of 21  November  1994
14
), and  RID  (Regulations  concerning the  International  Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Rail) (Directive 96/49/EC of  23 July  1996
15
).  These technical annexes reflect the 
IAEA transport regulations for radioactive material in class 7 of  the dangerous goods classification. 
As a further harmonisation measure the Commission has adopted a proposal for a Council Directive on 
the approximation of  the laws of  the Member States with regard to the transport of  dangerous goods by 
vessels on inland waterways (COM(97) 367 final)). 
9  OJ  L 159 of29 June  1996, p.  1 
10  IAEA-Safety Series No.  115-I- International Basic Safety Standards for the protection against 
Ionising Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources 1996 edition 
11  OJ  L 35 of 12 February 1992, p. 24 
12  OJ  L 268 of 29 October 1993, p. 83 
ll OJ  L 148 of 19 June 1993, p.  1 
14  OJ  L 319 of 12 December 1994. p. 7 
15  OJ  L 235 of 17 September 1996. p. 25 
}_o 2.3.3  Dincti11e 011 Colftrols 
Controls-In no lonaer carried out at the internal frontiers of  the European Union, their elimination 
being p8lll of  the proceu of  establishina the European internal market;  however, compensatory 
measureaare necessary.  One such led to the adoption of  Directive 9~"0/EC  of6 October  199~ on 
unifonn fiOCedures for checks on danaerous goods being transported by road. 
The cbecla must be carried out in accordance with a specified checklist and must be completed within 
a reason-.1e period of  time.  Samples may be taken during the checks. Certain infringements, listed in 
an Ann191-to the Directive, result in the journey not being permitted to continue or the vehicle being 
reftlsed lftlry into the European Community. 
The autMrities of  the Member States are required to assist one another.  Infonnation on the checks is 
exchanpd and Member States send an annual report, also specified in an AMex to the Directive, to the 
Comm~.  ' 
2.3.4  Driver Trabri11g 
The traiaiag of  drivers of  vehicles carrying danaerous aoods, includinJ radioactive substances, was 
improved and bannonised on I January 1997.  Drivers of vehicles subject to reaistration now have to 
follow a •uic 18 hour training course.  Those drivers planning to transport radioactive substances in 
class 7 not in excepted packages must also attend an additional eight hour course.  (This latter 
requirement does not apply to drivers transporting radioactive substances solely in Type A packages, if 
the total .amber of  packages containing radioactive substances in the vehicle does not exceed 10 and 
the sum of  the transport indices does not exceed three. In this case appropriate training must be 
provided by the employer.) 
After pauma an examination drivers are issued with what is known as an ADR certificate;  this is 
mutually recopised in all ADR States for trans-frontier transport operations,· and in Member States of 
the Europua Union for national transport operations. 
2.4.  INH/opme11ts at the IMO 
The Codl for the safe caniage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and high-level radioactive wastes 
in flub  en board ships {INF Code)
16 was adopted by the 18th Assembly of  the International Maritime 
Organizalian (IMO) in November 1993 as a vohmtary Code of  Practice for application by IMO 
Member States. The INF Code applies in addition to the applicable IAEA Transport Regulations and 
the requiiaments of  Class 7 ofthe International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code. It covers 
principallY matters of  ship desiJ11, construction and equipment. 
The Assembly also requested the Oraanization's Maritime Safety Committee and Marine Environment 
ProtectiOII Committee, in consultation with IAEA, to keep the Code under regular review and amend it 
as necesqry. These committees are currently discussing the subjects of  emergency response, 
notificatien provided to coastal states, routing of  ships carrying fNF materials, and liability regimes. 
The IM6is considering making both the INF Code and the IMDG Code mandatory. 
16 Resolution A  748( 18):  Code for the Safe Carriaae of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel. Plutonium and High-
Level Raaioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships. 3  MAJOR ISSUES AND CONCERNS 
3.1 Regulatory Issues arising from the 1996 edition of the IAEA regulations 
3.1.1  Radiation Protection Programmes 
Radiation protection programmes help optimise radiation protection. They provide a structured and 
systematic approach to keeping the magnitude of individual doses, the numbers of persons exposed 
and the risk of  exposure as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into 
account. 
Transport comprises all operations and conditions associated with and involved in the movement of 
radioactive materials. Radiation protection measures need to be considered at all stages from design to 
fmal receipt of shipments of  radioactive materials. All transport operations have a potential impact on 
the radiation exposure ofworkers and members of  the public. Co-operation between all those involved 
will enhance safety in the transport of  radioactive materials. 
Radiation protection programmes (RPPs) will cover many areas of  transport but particular attention 
must be given to package preparation and the arrangements for moving radioactive materials, since 
members of  the public may be in close proximity to such materials during transport.  Moving involves 
consignors, carriers and consignees:  all are required to co-operate in ensuring the safe transport of 
radioactive materials. The type of  measures to be employed in RPPs will depend upon the magnitude 
and likelihood of  exposures involved. Many programmes will be small but operations which have the 
potential for significant exposures can be expected to be the subject of  extensive programmes. 
The elements of  a documented  RPP will include :-
•  roles and responsibilities of managers and workers, 
•  radiation dose evaluation and comparison with good practice, 
•  emergency response, 
•  training, and 
•  information. 
Radiation Protection Programmes have an important role to play in keeping the radiation exposures of 
workers and members of  the public as low as reasonably achievable. 
3.1.2  Exemption Values 
The principles and methods for establishing exemption values have been published by the European 
Commission 
17 and endorsed by the International Atomic Energy Agency's Basic Safety Standards and 
Euratom 96/29. These documents contain, for all practices, radionuclide-specific activity and activity 
concentration values below which reporting is not required. 
But the BSS approach, which leads to radionuclide-specific exemption values, is not compatible with a 
single activity figure such as the 70 kBqlkg used in the current transport regulations.  A preliminary 
study was therefore undertaken to examine the relevance of  the BSS exemption values to the transport 
regulations.  Because no specific transport scenarios were considered in the methodology used by the 
BSS, this study took into account relevant transport scenarios for selected radionuclides in order to 
derive transport-specific exemption values using the same basic radiological dose criteria. 
17 Principles and Methods for Establishing Concentrations and Quantities (Exemption values) Below 
which Reporting is not Required in the European Directive.  Radiation Protection 65. M Harvey, S 
Mobbs, J Cooper, AM Chapuis, A Sugier, T Scneider, J Lochard and A Janssens.  Commission of  the 
European Communities 1993 
22.. Most re•lts were close to the BSS values and all were within two orders of  magnitude. Such a range 
was considered insufficient to establish transport-specific exemption values different from those of  the 
BSS. BeQWSe of  the general agreement between the transport-specific exemption values and those of 
the BSS, ~twas  considered reasonable to adopt, in the  1996 edition of  the Transport Regulations, the 
BSS exemption values below which the transport regulation would not apply. The activity 
concentqlion values are applied to a packqe or, where the material is unpackaged, to a conveyance: 
for operltional convenience, the total activity restrictions are applied to the consignment. Possible 
problem• in the implem·entation of  the new exemption values are being examined in a Community-
fmanced Jtudy. 
3.1.3  Air Transpol't 
One oftba major changes in the 1996 edition of  the IAEA Transport. Regulations was the introduction 
of  much more stringent safety requirements for the air transport of large quantities of  radioactive 
materials:  The Type C package and a new material standard, Low Dispersible Material (LDM), for 
material carried in Type B packages have been introduced. 
The Type C Package. 
The Typa C package testing requirements are detailed in Appendix 1.\ 
I 
One of  the very stringent test conditions  for Type C packages is a 90\m/s impact onto an unyielding 
surface.  The impact speed has been intensively discussed during the IAEA revisien process since 
1988.  1M  value of  90 m/s was derived from studies in France ( 1989), the UK ( 1980) and the USA 
(1990) a. accident-impact probabilities based on the best accident data available at the time. 
DiscussiQa of  these studies showed that a ranae ofequivalent, perpendicular impact velocities from 85 
m/s to  I  GO m/s onto an unyielding taraet covered approximately 90-95% of  all severe aircraft 
accidents.  Beyond this range, even large increues in impact test velocity p~oduce relatively small 
improvements in safety.  In practice, it was noted that such impact velocities onto an unyielding target 
covered a much larger ranae of impact airspeeds due to mitigating factors such as: target hardness, 
impact aaate, energy absorbed by the conveyance and the over-performance and subsequent 'graceful 
failure' of  real packages designed to IAEA standards. 
During dtis process, note was also taken of  the US domestic regulation NUREG- 0360 and the criteria 
for aircr2' flight data recorders. There was recognition that NUREG-0360 is more stringent in terms of 
packag~  performance than the requirements contained in the IAEA Regulations. However, NUREG- · 
0360 procilces little gain in risk reduction above that provided by the IAEA standards.  It should also 
be noted that NUREG-0360 applies only to plutonium whereas the IAEA standards apply to all 
radionuclides. 
No direc1 comparison of  the impact speed test criteria for a Flight Data Recorder (FOR) and a Type C 
package i:an be made.  Although both testin& regimes are extremely onerous they are designed for 
different purposes and have different pass/fail criteria.  Moreover, the Type C tests establish a standard 
which is consistent for every size and mass of  package whereas the FOR tests do not. 
Low diapenible material (LDM) 
Since thci primary hazards be  in& addressed in Type C requirements are dispersion and radiation levels, 
provisions have been made for materials which exhibit limited dispersibility, solubility, and radiation 
levels. nese provisions are contained in a material category known as "low dispersible material" 
(LDM). For radioactive material to qualify as LDM, the radiation level of  the unpackaged material 
must be ••low a given value and the airborne release of  radioactive material in gaseous or particulate 
form foltlwing the same severe test conditions on the material itself as would be applied to a Type C 
package(impact and thermal test) must also be limited. In addition, a leaching test which takes into account the damaging effects of the impact and thennal 
tests on the radioactive material must also lead to limited dissolved aqueous activity. Materials which 
meet these stringent LDM requirements would not require Type C packaging and could therefore be 
transported in a Type B package. The test requirements for LDM material are included in the IAEA 
regulations and summarised in Appendix I. Multilateral Competent Authority approval of  the design of 
the LDM is required. 
3.1.4  LSA/SCO 
In the course of  the revision of  the IAEA regulations  it was recognised that the regulatory 
requirements and corresponding justifications for the shipment of Low Specific Activity (LSA) 
materials and for Surface Contaminated Objects (SCO) should be reviewed and possibly modified. 
Such materials are mostly radioactive wastes and radioactive materials from the decommissioning of 
nuclear facilities. The current requirements were drawn up in the 1970s, since when substantial 
changes have taken place in the characteristics of radioactive wastes.  It was therefore concluded that 
the radiological considerations on which the current requirements are based needed a critical review. 
In an initial feasibility study in  1994, funded by the Community, a tentative new system of 
requirements for LSA/SCO materials was developed by European experts. New material classes based 
on a comprehensive radiological consequence model were defined with the aim of facilitating 
compliance with regulatory requirements.  ,. 
In order to achieve further progress and to promote a hannonised input from the EU to the IAEA Co-
ordinated Research Programmes, one of the Community-funded projects evaluates the practicability, 
benefits and possible drawbacks of  the recently-proposed new system. The ongoing IAEA-CRP work 
uses the radwaste data bases of  three EU participating countries. 
3.2 Other Issues and Concerns 
3.2.1  Perceived and Actual Risks 
Each year several million packages containing radioactive materials are safely transported in Member 
States. Most of these shipments are for medical and general industrial use, only a small fraction being 
associated wi~  the nuclear fuel cycle. Transport regulations  require that packages have built-in safety 
features such that in the event of  an accident the conseqaences are limited. Additionally the 
conveyance must  comply with set criteria and the driver of a road vehicle must have adequate training 
including response in the event of  an emergency. 
Accidents and incidents occur during transport, and considerable attention is devoted to those 
involving radioactive materials, particularly nuclear fuel cycle materials. Studies of events in Member 
States
11 have shown that  releases of radioactive material are rare and the radiological consequences are 
fairly insignificant.  However, major radiation exposures have been suffered by industrial 
radiographers who have failed to correctly package their source prior to driving to another location. 
Improved training has done much to reduce the number of  such events. 
The routing of  shipments depends upon operational and, where relevant, physical protection 
considerations . In some cases it is necessary to notify and/or seek the approval of the authorities for 
shipments through or into their country.  · 
All modes of  transport are covered by regulations and the safety record is excellent. Accidents do 
occur but the consequences are limited by design and by operational procedures. 
11 Review, Analysis and Report on the Radiological Consequences Resulting from Accidents and 
Incidents involving Radioactive Materials during Transport in the Period 1975-1986 by and within 
Member States of  the European Communities. J. Lombard, C Ringot, E. Tomachevsky, J.  S. Hughes 
and K. B Shaw.  EUR 12768 EN. Commission of the European Communities 1990. However, lessons must be learnt from transport incidents and accidents in order to avoid a repetition or 
a worse event. Miner events have their sipificance and may be the precursor to more serious incidents 
or accidents. The Standing Working Group, which meets with the Competent Authorities, the IAEA 
and (on request} industry, has regular exchanges of information on events which have occurred in 
transport. 
The Competent Authorities should periodically assess the consequences of transport accidents. 
Emergency planning by the Competent Authorities and other responsible authorities, such as the public 
health and safety organisations, should take account of  these assessments. To facilitate this process, the 
IAEA has published recommendations on emergency response planning for transport accidents 
involviaa radioactive material 19• This set of  recommendations is currently under revision. 
Emergmcies will occur and it is important to obtain accurate information on the consequences of the 
event. In order to grade the importance of  such incidents and accidents, the Commission has started 
contract work on developing an event severity scale for transport events,
10 consistent with the existing 
International Nuclear Event Scale (INES} which is widely accepted and regularly applied to fixed 
installationsl1• 
3.2.2 Technical Assistance and Industrial Co-operation with CEEC and NIS 
The programme for technical assistance to the New Independent States (NIS) involves two contracts in 
the field of  nuclear transport safety which were started in  1995: first, an engineering assessment of  the 
proposed improvement to the container for transporting VVER spent fuel; secondly, a general 
assessment of  the transport of irradiated nuclear fuel in the NIS. 
The objective is not only to make valid proposals to improve safety but also to create a climate of 
mutual co-operation on technical matters between highly-specialised technical support organisations. 
Under 1he PHARE (Assistance for Economic Restructuring in the Countries of  Central and Eastern 
Europe) and TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) programmes, 
the EU continues to provide the CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries} and the NIS with 
technical assistance to improve their nuclear safety.  In addition, the Commission intends w  set up a 
framework for industrial co-operation with those countries. 
The scope of  industrial co-operation is very broad and covers the needs of  the transport industry 
operatiag in the nuclear fuel cycle in Eastern countries. Industrial co-operation on the transport of 
radioactive material could lead to the development of  pilot projects as a basis for broader co-operation. 
With the public call for tenders launched in May 1996, :l an official appeal was made to the transport 
industry to make a start on the above schemes.  However, no suitable proposals were received and a 
renewed appeal should  be issued along with any future call for tenders. 
3.2.3  Quality Assurance 
For packages requiring Competent Authority approval and certification, approval will not be granted 
unless there are adequate quality assurance programmes for package design, testing, manufacture, use, 
mainteaance and transport. This is a well-established practice in all Member States and accounts for 
the high quality performance of the packages currently in use.  For packages not requiring Competent 
Authority approval, quality assurance proarammes are still necessary and the Competent Authority 
may check their adequacy by carrying out periodic compliance audits or using other appropriate 
compliance assuraoce methods. 
19 Safety Series No. 87 'Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for Transport Accidents 
Involving Radioactive Material' - IAEA, VieMa- 1988 
2°  Conbct work started by 'National Radiological Protection Board' in 1997 with financial 
contribution of  the Community. 
ll INES: The International Nuclear Event Scale IAEA VieMa 1992 
ll OJ  C 136 of8 May 1996, p.  16 In principle, all aspects ofthe activities relating to the safe transport of  radioactive material should be 
covered by a quality assurance programme. The IAEA has published two booklets
23
·:
4 to provide 
guidance on quality and compliance assurance programmes. When an incident occurs it is necessary to 
review the conclusions of  the analysis together with all the documents governing the transport practice, 
including standards, rules, regulations, the quality assurance programmes and the various operational 
procedures. 
However, even a single transport operation may involve several different organisations and it is 
unlikely that the operation will be covered by a single quality assurance programme. The following are 
relevant: 
•  the designer(s) of  the package; 
•  the manufacturer of  the package and the laboratory which tests it; 
•  the user of  the package in relation to its different applications, 
•  the carrier who makes use of  different transport organisations and infrastructures. 
Quality assurance programmes are tailored to fit specific organisational structures, and an analysis of 
an incident or accident in relation to the different quality assurance programmes can be extremely 
complicated.  The Commission's Standing Working Group gives particular attention to this aspect with 
a view to sharing infonnation with other Member States for their mutual benefit. 
3.2.4 Illicit Cross-border Movements of  Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources 
When the Commission first decided to address the issue of illicit cross-border movements, a dual 
approach was necessary: one for the illicit trafficking of  nuclear material and the other for the 
inadvertent movement of  radioactive sources. 
Competent Authorities for the safe transport of  radioactive material in the different Member States do 
not necessarily have the major responsibility since this lies, in the first area, with the authorities 
concerned wilh physical protection/safeguards and, in the second, with those responsible for 
authorisation.  Nevertheless, transport authorities are very often the fll'st to be involved if iilicit or 
inadvertent movements are discovered. Consequently, and because these activities often affect several 
countries, the issue is frequently addressed at meetings of  the Standing Working Group. 
With regard to the illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, the Commission participates in Interagency 
Co-ordination Meetings organised by the IAEA on prevention, detection and response measures, in 
close cooperation with the transport organisations (ICAO, IMO), the Dangerous Goods Transport (rail 
and road) Division of  the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the World Customs Organisations 
and Interpol and Europol.  The principal aim of  the meetings is to exchange infonnation and to identify 
any necessary further action  .. 
The Commission is funding a detection and monitoring feasibility study, to help prevent fue illicit 
trafficking of  nuclear material and radioactive sources at sea ports in the EU Member States. The 
outcome of  the study will be presented to the Ship/Shore Interface sub-committee of  IMO which has 
shown particular interest.  t 
Measures to help prevent illicit cross-border movements of  radioactive material are still on the agenda 
ofthe Standing Working Group. In particular, it is involved with identification, detection and response 
measures. It will continue to support further action where this is justified if  additional resources 
become available in the coming years. 
23  Safety Practice No.  113 on 'Quality Assurances for the Safe Transport of Radioactive  Material' -
IAEA, Vienna- 1994 
24  Safety Practice No 112 on Compliance Assurance for the Safe Transport of  Radioactive Material 
IAEA Vienna 1994 4.  ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S 
STANDING WORKING GROUP 
4.1  Past activities 
A number of projects associated with the safe transport of radioactive material have been completed in 
recent years for the Commission. In some cases they were either feasibility studies or the initial phases 
of more extensive projects. 
The work covered  some of  the aspects of transport from design to final receipt of the material.  The 
depth of  the projects was often limited by the scale of  the work funded.  However these studies did 
provide useful information to Member States, the IAEA and the Commission. 
For example, the transport events occurring in Member States over a ten year period were reviewed 
and analysed. The report concluded that the reporting of data on events was most comprehensive in the 
nuclear industry and that there had been no major health consequences. In all of the accidents or 
incidents  reviewed in the study it was shown  that packages conforming to regulatory standards 
provided adequate protection. 
Another project involved drawing up a handbook 
2s of  emergency arrangements in Member States, 
including details of  systems, contacts and the emergency equipment available. 
4.2  Current programme 
A plan of  action for the further development of transport studies has been established by the 
Commission. The programme is divided into seven areas : 
•  functioning of  the single market and the need for harmonisation, 
•  assessment of  the implementation of the regulations, 
•  revision of  transport regulations, 
•  investigation of  transport events, 
•  transport emergency arrangements, 
•  assistance to the CEEC and NIS, and 
•  information and communication with the public. 
Work is already under way on the first four of  these areas.  Care needs to be taken that the other two 
are not neglected in future programmes. The Commission is providing fmancing for 24 projects being 
carried out within various organisations in the Member States. There is extensive co-operation between 
Member States, and the projects concerned are listed in Table I. 
In  1996, with the reopening of  the budget heading "Transport of radioactive material in the European 
Union", the Commission organised a public invitation to tender in accordance with the budget heading· 
description given by the European Parliament.  As a result of  this invitation to tend~r. the Commission 
received 43  proposals.  Once the proposals had been assessed by the Commission, the Standing 
Working Group was asked for its opinion on ranking of  the proposals as of first and second priority. 
Within the constraints of the budget, all 15 first priority proposals and 3 proposals of  second priority 
were the subject of  contracts awarded in  1996 (see Table I).  Additional funding in the 1997 budget 
was made available to cover the remaining second priority proposals together with six additional 
projects  .. 
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z:r Many of the proposals could lead to hannonisation of  the regulations within the EU based on the  1996 
edition of the IAEA transport regulations. 
At the second meeting of the IAEA's Transport Safety Standards Advisory Committee (TRANSSAC) 
in March 1997, the initiative to fund the Commission's activities in the field ofthe safe transport of 
radioactive materials was welcomed and their valuable contribution to the ongoing process of  revising 
the IAEA regulations was recognised.  However, a number of  EU Member States noted that these 
efforts will require continuous and regular funding over the next few years to cover all areas of  the 
programme and to build on the initial phases of  the longer-term projects. 
4.3  Future work 
Transport arrangements reflect developments in many different areas, for example materials, processes, 
conveyances and protection principles.  To take sufficient account of such changes there must be an 
ongoing Community transport programme subject to periodic review. A number of  the current projects 
are initial phases of longer-term studies aimed at major improvements in transport requirements and 
systems. 
IAEA transport regulations are adopted world-wide for all modes of  transport: they have been  subject 
to periodic revision since the first edition in 1961. The current edition of  these  regulations was 
published in  1996 : the next edition will contain improvements developed during the new revision 
cycle. Input to the revision process must be supported by adequate justification including relevant 
technical studies. For example, it is widely accepted that there is room for improvement in the 
requirements for Low Specific Activity materials and Surface Contaminated Objects.  To enable the 
EU to contribute fully-developed proposals for improving transport requirements, it is essential to have 
an adequate programme of  studies covering a number ofyears. 
A further example concerns the qualification methods for Low Dispersible Material (LDM). According 
to the Regulations, approval ofLDM has to be on a bilateral or multilateral basis.  It is therefore vital 
that the parties concerned work together, economising development efforts and promoting co-operation 
at an early stage between various institutions of Member States of the EU, including Competent 
Authorities and test facilities.  This has already been initiated by the Commission through a pilot 
project to develop test procedures to qualify radioactive materials as LDM. Because of  the high level 
of  effort required to develop and conduct the tests, it seems probable that a common approach and 
possibly a common test facility will have to be developed within the European Union. This is a further 
area were the Commission could support and promote collaboration among Member States. 
Transport studies are also important in other respects, for example in providing information on lessons 
learnt. Accidents and incidents occur during transport and  such information may help to avoid  similar 
events elsewhere. Information and communication on transport safety are important and information 
on the consequences of  transport operations can improve public perception. The periodic assessment of 
radiation doses due to the transport of radioactive material within the EU (ST-1, para 304) should be 
encouraged.  This would produce an overall picture of  the situation within the EU  andj~tify the 
existing regulations or, alternatively, reveal the need for funher regulatory action. 
Special attention should be  ~iven to projects to improve transpon safety by implementing the  1996 
edition of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material in the CEEC and NlS. APPENDIX  I:  SUMMARY OF TESTING REQUIREMENTS 
Type C Packages. 
The appropriate tests are: 
•  those applicable to Type B(U) packages and, if  appropriate, packages for fissile materials (see 
the third report for d-:tails); 
•  a puncture/tearing test in which either a truncated cone-shaped probe is dropped 3 metres onto 
the package or the package is dropped onto the probe, depending on the mass of  the package 
specimen; 
•  an enhanced thennal test, with the same technical specifications as the Type B package 
thermal test but lasting 60 minutes; 
•  a 200 m water immersion test; 
and an impact speed of  90 m/s for the "drop" test onto an unyielding target, angling it in such a way as 
to cause maximum damage to the package. 
Uranium Hexafluoride. 
Packages:-
•  must withstand an internal test pressure of  at least 1.4 MPa, but cylinders with a test pressure 
less than 2.8 MPa require multilateral approval; 
•  must withstand the "Type A" drop test, with graduated heights froltl 0.3 to 1.2 m, depending 
on package mass; 
•  designed to contain 0.1  ~g  or more but less than 9 000 kg of  UF6 must meet the "Type B" 
thermal test of  800 C for 30 minutes; 
•  designed to contain 9 000 kg or more must either meet the thermal test requirements or have 
multilateral approval; 
Furthermore, packages containing fissile UF6 must meet the test conditions applicable to fissile 
packages ("Type B" impact and thermal tests) with no contact between the valve and other normally 
non-contacting parts of the packaging.  There must be no leakage from the valve, and the package must 
meet other operational requirements before the designer can assume it is watertight for the purposes of 
the safety analysis. 
Low Dispersible Material (LDM) 
l~ 
•  The total amount of low dispersible material in a package is limited so that the  radiation level 
at 3 m from the unshielded radioactive materialllJUSt not exceed I  0 mSvlh. 
•  Following the Type C impact test and enhanced thermal test, the airborne release in gaseous 
and particulate forms (up to 100 micro meter aerodynamic equivalent diameter) must not 
exceed 100 times the radionuclide-specific A2 values. 
•  In addition, following a leaching (solubility) test consisting of immersion in water for seven 
days, activity in the water should not exceed I  00 A2•  When applying this test, the damaging 
eftects of the tests specified in the second paragraph above must be taken into account. 
•  Furthermore, a package containing Low Dispersible radioactive Material must be so designed 
that any features added to the Low Dispersible radioactive Material which are not part of it, or 
any internal components of  the packaging, does not adversely affect the performance of  the 
Low Dispersible radioactive Material. lJ-) 
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TITLE 
Evaluation of  the safety of  vitrified high level waste shipments from the UK to continental Europe by sea 
Assessment of  the radiological risks from transport accidents involving Type A Packages 
Development of  evaluation methods for the qualification of  Low Dispersible Material (LDM) 
' 
Safety assessment of Leaktightness Criteria for Radioactive Material Transport Packages: studies of  seal stability and performance under 
thermal aging processes and resulting potential for material leakage 
Examination of  the existing transport emergency arrangements in the Member States and the discussion of  the benefits which result 
Further development of radiological criteria and requirements for the transport of LSA and SCO material 
Feasibility study on detection and monitoring systems and procedures to prevent illicit trafficking of  radioactive and fissile material at sea ports 
in the EU Member States 
Practical implication of  the adoption of  exemption values in transport Contract 
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TITLE 
Surveys on the events during transport 
Development of  an event severity scale for incidents/accidents 
Harmonisation of  methods for the nuclear criticality safety evaluation of  transport packages 
Qualification experiments on the release behaviour ofLSA material in accident conditions with mechanical impact 
Evaluation of  external radiation levels from transport packages to the quantities and units specified by ICRP and ICRU, and in relation to the 
Basic Safety Sta.ndards of  the EU 
Evaluation of the radiation protection options related to the Low Weight Packages- category Ill yellow 
Segregation of  packages during transport 
Evaluation of  codes for Analysing the Drop Test Performance of Radioactive Material Transport Containers 
Evaluation of  safety of casks impacting different kinds of targets- Real Target Impact Studies 
Harmonisation of  the Qualification of Procedures and Personnel (Guide of  practice evaluation of  events) 
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TITLE 
Hannonisierung der Methoden zur Bewertung der Verpackungssicherheit in Obereinstimmung mit den Vorschriften 
Risk Assessment for the transport of irradiated nuclear fuel  in the NIS 
I 
Evaluation of  the Situation in the EC as regards Safety in the Transport of  Radioactive Material and the Prospects for the Development of  such 
type of  transport 
Emergency arrangements in the area of  transport 
Hannonisation of  the Performance of  the Packages and the Level of intrinsic Safety of  the Material 
"Analysis of Rail Accident Frequencies and Severity for the Assessment of Radioactive Material Transport Risk" 
Accident analysis of  spent fuel shipping casks transported by rail 